If President Vladimir Putin learned anything from his sojourn to Texas last November to meet the president of the United States, it's that PR is everything.

Positive spin is probably the most Putin can expect from his summit with George W. Bush next week in Moscow and St. Petersburg. The United States is not in the mood to justify its international behavior. If Putin and his people have enough say about the meeting's choreography, they also won't have to justify or explain much.

Bush is scheduled to be in Russia for almost four days. This seems to be a very long time just to say that Washington appreciates Moscow's participation in the war against terrorism. How many days does it take to express thanks that no real fuss was created by Russia when the Bush administration announced unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty? How many hours will it take Bush or one of his handlers to convince the Russian leader that free trade is only beneficial if doesn't hurt industries back home?

We can expect a lot of backslapping and shashlyk-eating at the summit, but no boozing, as Bush found religion on his 40th birthday after years of hard partying. Content-wise, the summit could be a bit sticky for both sides, as anything of substance would likely lead to more domestic criticism of Putin's pro-West stands – especially on the subject of what Russia has gained from this "new relationship."

Bush clearly is a politician who prefers sound bites. Putin, disappointingly enough, appears to be reading from the same lackluster page as his counterpart. Russia and Putin can and need to do better.

The upcoming summit is odd: There is no real reason to meet. I am reminded that an important arms-reduction agreement is being prepared for signing, and Jackson-Vanik may be repealed beforehand. But both are really meaningless in the scheme of things.

Both issues address the past relationship, not the present, including how both countries can and need to move forward. The Bush administration does not have a vision for its relationship with Russia – it is too preoccupied with trying to prove that the foreign policy of the current president's father, who served from 1989-93, was correct. Putin can take comfort in a strange way – it's a Bush roadshow, which means it is a Russia sideshow. At the very least, Bush will demonstrate that Russia is important only because he likes Putin. This is not an acceptable U.S. foreign policy concerning Russia.

A new arms-control agreement between the two countries serves America's geopolitical purposes and gently disguises Russia's economic weakness. Russia can protest all it wants, but the dollars and cents of arms control caught up with the country a long time ago. The Bush people are doing Russia a favor by not rubbing it in too much. In the longer term, Russia's security interests are really about economic reform at home. Significantly downgrading differences concerning an arms-control agreement is a strategy Putin should pursue, or, at the very least, he should use such differences to bolster Russia's economy. Trading a tough stance on arms control for support of a future bilateral energy agreement makes a lot more sense.

Repealing Jackson-Vanik is more an American embarrassment than a favor for the Kremlin. If Washington can recognize Kazakstan as a market economy, why is there even debate to recognize Russia? Leakage of various political and policy agendas came to an end long ago. That the Bush administation accepted Pakistan's recent presidential referendum without a fuss, but still has to convince Congress that the Russia of today is different from the Soviet Union, is something verging on surreal.

Putin will be patient because he has to be. Bush helps veil his counterpart's shortcomings and failings. The quagmire of Chechnya defines the failure to understand nationalism in the past century, and the meaning of national identity in the new one. The conflict serves as a daily, senseless testament to the Soviet legacy of misunderstanding.

Putin claimed in his annual state of the nation address that the war was over, though 21 pro-Moscow police officers were killed that same day in Chechnya – presumably as he was speaking. America's hegemonic, rhetorical and very real presence helps countries like Russia cling to the past.

The United States is making the same Cold War mistakes. The new century has not created a new way of thinking. Rather, the Cold War mentality has been transmuted; old vessels have been refilled with a different wine. Little has been learned, and now the stakes are dangerously higher. U.S. foreign policy is creating a conflict of cultures – the obvious design of the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks. Russia is only following because of hapless short-term political designs. Resolving the Chechnya crisis is a Russian problem; it should not be internationalized on the back of the United States' desire for revenge and satisfaction.

Is a meaningful U.S.-Russia relationship possible? Of course it is. All that is needed is sober political will and dialogue. But as long as the United States continues to obfuscate its foreign policy, this is illusory. Clearly, the U.S. military is unmatched in the field, but American politicians remain amateurs in the diplomatic realm. Russia is a country that can and has admitted to some past mistakes; it can tell us where we have gone wrong. Putin's Russia has the chance to demonstrate how past thinking has failed. Unfortunately, my sense is that Putin remains ambivalent – not unlike his domestic agenda.

Bush is not interested in reflecting on the past to build the future. The summit will be nothing more than a congregation of embarrassed and strained faces.

Peter Lavelle is head of research at a Moscow-based brokerage.